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Abstract
The classical cake cutting problem studies how to find fair allocations of a heterogeneous and
divisible resource among multiple agents. Two of the most commonly studied fairness concepts
in cake cutting are proportionality and envy-freeness. It is well known that a proportional
allocation among n agents can be found efficiently via simple protocols [16]. For envy-freeness,
in a recent breakthrough, Aziz and Mackenzie [5] proposed a discrete and bounded envy-free
protocol for any number of players. However, the protocol suffers from high multiple-exponential
query complexity and it remains open to find simpler and more efficient envy-free protocols.
In this paper we consider a variation of the cake cutting problem by assuming an underlying
graph over the agents whose edges describe their acquaintance relationships, and agents evaluate
their shares relatively to those of their neighbors. An allocation is called locally proportional if
each agent thinks she receives at least the average value over her neighbors. Local proportionality
generalizes proportionality and is in an interesting middle ground between proportionality and
envy-freeness: its existence is guaranteed by that of an envy-free allocation, but no simple
protocol is known to produce such a locally proportional allocation for general graphs. Previous
works showed locally proportional protocols for special classes of graphs, and it is listed in
both [1] and [8] as an open question to design simple locally proportional protocols for more
general classes of graphs. In this paper we completely resolved this open question by presenting
a discrete and bounded locally proportional protocol for any given graph. Our protocol has a
query complexity of only single exponential, which is significantly smaller than the six towers
of n query complexity of the envy-free protocol given in [5].
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1 Introduction
The problem of fair division studies how to allocate a set of scarce resources to a set of interested
agents in a fair manner. When the resource is heterogeneous and divisible, the problem is known
as “cake cutting” and has a long and intriguing history in multiple disciplines such as economics,
social science, political science, and computer science [11, 20, 19]. In the standard model, a single
heterogeneous resource, also known as a cake, is represented by the interval [0, 1]. Each agent has
a valuation function which defines her preference over different parts of the resource. The goal
is to distribute the resource to the agents using standard queries [20], such that everyone feels
she is treated “fairly”. Two of the most prominent concepts to measure fairness in cake cutting
are proportionality and envy-freeness. Informally, proportionality means that each agent, in her
own view, gets at least an average share of the cake; and envy-freeness means that each agent
weakly prefers her own piece to any other agent’s. It is not hard to see that envy-freeness implies
proportionality but not vice versa.
It is well known that a proportional allocation among n agents can be efficiently found using
O(n log n) queries [16]. In the meanwhile, since the 1940s, the envy-free cake cutting problem has
baffled the great minds from multiple disciplines. It was not until 2016 that discrete and bounded
envy-free protocols for four and more players were finally proposed by Aziz and Mackenzie [6, 5].
Despite these groundbreaking advances, the main drawback of the new protocols is their high query
complexity in the form of six towers of n. The unrealistic number of evaluations and cuts required
by the protocols prevents them from being put into practical use.
A common assumption made by all previous works is that each agent is aware of which parts
every other agent gets, and is comparing her own piece to everyone else’s. This is not necessarily
the case in many contexts where each agent’s knowledge and focus are local. In light of this, two
independent works [1, 8] considered a notion of local fairness 1. Their model assumes an underlying
social network over the agents, and defines proportionality and envy-freeness locally in relation to
their neighbors: given an underlying graph of the agents, an allocation is locally envy-free if no
agents envies any of her neighbor’s share, and is locally proportional if every agent values her own
share no less than the average among her neighbors. Both local proportionality and local envy-
freeness are weaker than the global envy-freeness. Yet from a practical point of view they capture
many situations in which global knowledge is unavailable or unrealistic. It is also hopeful that
by considering only local comparisons, there could exist simpler and more intuitive protocols that
produce locally fair allocations.
For local envy-freeness, a nontrivial continuous protocol for trees was proposed in [8] when the
protocol is allowed to perform the so-called Austin Cut Procedure [3]. However, this protocol is
hard to generalize. What’s worse, it seems a far-fetched task to have a simple but general locally
envy-free protocol for any given graph. If we have such a protocol, then by applying the result to
the complete graph, it would imply a simple globally envy-free protocol. From previous works and
attempts, this seems to be a very difficult task.
On the other hand, local proportionality poses an intriguing case. First of all, a simple globally
proportional protocol can be easily found [16]. However, unlike local envy-freeness, local propor-
tionality is not a monotone property. That is, a globally proportional allocation is not necessarily
locally proportional for a particular graph. In the meanwhile, for any graph, the existence of a
locally proportional allocation is guaranteed from that of a globally envy-free allocation. In [8],
the authors gave a simple locally proportional protocol for a special class of graphs known as the
1This notion is termed local fairness in [1] and networked fairness in [8]. We adopt the former terminology in this
paper. For better clarification, we will sometimes also call the original definitions of these two fairness notions global
proportionality and global envy-freeness.
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descendant graph. It is listed both in [1] and [8] as an open question to design simple and locally
proportional protocols for more classes of graphs.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we completely resolve the aforementioned open question by
presenting a protocol that is able to produce a locally proportional allocation for any given graph.
The protocol only has a single exponential query complexity, which is a significant improvement
over the six towers of n query complexity of the globally envy-free protocol from [5]. It is a
discrete protocol in that it only requires standard queries [20] and does not require any continuous
operations such as the moving-knife procedure. It also shows that proportionality can indeed be
algorithmically generalized to incorporate graphical structures in a simple and efficient way.
Similar to most envy-free cake cutting protocols [2, 5, 6, 10], our protocol maintains a locally
proportional partial allocation and an unallocated residue of the cake. It repeatedly updates both
parts throughout its execution, until the unallocated residue is allocated completely. We rely on
the concept of dominant agents to help eliminate the residue. Intuitively speaking, an agent is
dominant if she remains proportional even if the residue were to be allocated among her neighbors.
This, as a result, allows us to allocate the residue only among non-dominant agents. Surprisingly,
in doing so, the remaining non-dominant agents can be made dominant as well in an efficient way,
based on the observation that the neighbors of a dominant agent are able to collect enough bonuses
over her and finally dominate her by excluding her from the remaining allocation.
Despite its useful corollaries, the argument above does not tell us how the first dominant agent
can be created. Indeed, this issue is the most difficult part of the problem. We manage to resolve
it by adopting the idea of exchanging pieces allocated to agents. In doing so, we hope that for a
specific agent, the pieces of insignificant values in her own view will be transferred to her neighbors’
hands. However, in general, exchanging pieces may incur large losses in agents’ shares. As a result,
the new allocation after exchange may not maintain the desired fairness any more. Previously, Aziz
and Mackenzie [5] managed to overcome this difficulty by reserving an enough fraction of the residue
and allocating it carefully to cover any possible losses. Their method is extremely complicated,
resulting in the towers of n query complexity. In contrast, we always split the allocation into
two parts, and restrict the exchange to take place within one of the two parts, such that the losses
incurred are covered by the bonuses reserved in the other part. We note that our method is possible
since we merely need to achieve the weaker proportionality constraint.
Related Work. It is well known that a globally proportional allocation among n agents can
be efficiently found using O(n log n) queries [16]. On the other hand, after a series of attempts
[17, 25], a matching lower bound was finally proved in [15]. In contrast, although a globally envy-
free allocation is guaranteed to exist [22, 23], finding such an allocation seems to be extremely hard.
In 1995, Brams and Taylor proposed a discrete but unbounded protocol [10]. However, their protocol
suffers from a significant drawback that the number of queries can be made arbitrarily large by
choosing certain agents’ valuation functions. Later, by resorting to the moving-knife procedure,
several continuous protocols were proposed for four agents [9, 7] and five agents [21]. It was not
until 2016 that discrete and bounded protocols for four and more agents were finally proposed by
Aziz and Mackenzie [6, 5]. The only known nontrivial lower bound is Ω(n2) [18].
The notion of local fairness with respect to social networks was first introduced to the cake
cutting problem independently in [1] and [8]. Previously known algorithmic results are mainly from
[8], which gave a locally envy-free continuous protocol for trees as well as a locally proportional
protocol for a special class of graphs known as the descendant graph.
The idea of restricted comparison has also been considered in the allocation of indivisible re-
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sources. For instance, both Chevaleyre et al. [14] and Brederect et al. [12] considered the graph
envy-freeness where envy can only arise between adjacent agents. Todo et al. [24] studied envy-
freeness between two groups of agents. Aziz et al. [4] proposed a family of epistemic notions of
fairness based on a social graph, establishing a hierarchy among various notions of fairness. Chen
and Shah [13] defined the so-called Bayesian envy-freeness under a Bayesian scenario.
Structure. In Section 2, we give a formal description of the problem and introduce some central
concepts as well as the Core Protocol in [5] used in our protocol. In section 3, we present a locally
proportional protocol for any given graph as well as its analysis. As a supplement, in section 4,
we discretize the continuous protocol in [8] to obtain a locally envy-free partial allocation on trees.
We conclude our paper by proposing several open problems in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
A cake is to be allocated among a set of n agents on an undirected social graph G = (V,E), with
each vertex v ∈ V identified with an agent. The cake is represented by the interval [0, 1]. A piece
of cake refers to a finite union of disjoint subintervals of [0, 1]. The collection {Av}v∈V of disjoint
pieces is called an allocation if piece Av is allocated to agent v. An allocation is partial if the union
of the allocated pieces is not the whole cake; otherwise it is complete. The unallocated part with
respect to a partial allocation is called a residue, often denoted by R. In a standard setting, the
cake is required to be allocated completely.
Each agent v ∈ V has a valuation function fv over different pieces of the cake, which is defined
on subintervals of [0, 1] and assumes the following properties.
• Normalized and nonnegative. fv([0, 1]) = 1 and fv(I) ≥ 0 for interval I ⊆ [0, 1].
• Additive. fv(I ∪ I ′) = fv(I) + fv(I ′) for disjoint intervals I, I ′.
• Divisible. For any interval I and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, there exists an interval I ′ ⊆ I such that
fv(I
′) = λ · fv(I).
We adopt the standard Robertson-Webb query model [20] to access agents’ valuations, in which
two kinds of queries are allowed.
• Evaluation queries. Given an interval [x, y] and an agent v, the query returns fv([x, y]).
• Cut queries. Given a point x ∈ [0, 1], a value α and an agent v, the query returns a point y
such that fv([x, y]) = α.
The complexity of a cake cutting protocol is measured by the total number of queries it uses.
Let N(v) denote the set of agent v’s neighbors and dv = |N(v)| denote its degree. Below are
two concepts used to measure the fairness of an allocation on a graph. By their definitions, we
may assume w.l.o.g that the graph is connected, since otherwise we can allocate the cake within a
particular component of the graph.
Definition 1 (Local proportionality). An allocation {Av}v∈V is locally proportional on a graph
G = (V,E) if for each v ∈ V , fv(Av) ≥ 1dv
∑
u∈N(v) fv(Au).
Definition 2 (Local envy-freeness). An allocation {Av}v∈V is locally envy-free on a graph G =
(V,E) if for each v ∈ V and u ∈ N(v), fv(Av) ≥ fv(Au).
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2.1 Central Concepts Used in Our Protocol
Similar to most cake cutting protocols [2, 5, 6, 10], our protocol maintains a locally proportional
partial allocation and a residue of the cake. It repeatedly invokes the Core Protocol in [5] to diminish
the residue throughout its execution, until the residue is allocated completely. We introduce several
concepts below to further identify the quality of an allocation. They play central roles in our
protocol for eliminating the unallocated residue.
Definition 3 (Dominant agents). Given an allocation {Av}v∈V and the residue R, an agent v is
dominant if fv(Av) ≥ 1dv (
∑
u∈N(v) fv(Au) + fv(R)).
Intuitively, a dominant agent will remain proportional even if the residue were to be allocated
among her neighbors. As a result, a dominant agent can be safely excluded from the allocation of
the residue, reducing the problem to a smaller scale. In essence, our protocol is all about how agents
can be made dominant. We rely on the following concept and observation to create a dominant
agent.
Definition 4 (Dominance between a pair of agents). Given an allocation {Av}v∈V and the residue
R, we say agent v dominates agent u if fv(Av) ≥ fv(Au) + fv(R).
Observation 1. Given an allocation {Av}v∈V and the residue R, if agent v is envy-free and
additionally she dominates at least one of her neighbors, then she is dominant.
Proof. Assume that agent v dominates her neighbor w, then fv(Av) ≥ fv(Aw)+fv(R). Since agent
v is also envy-free, fv(Av) ≥ fv(Au) for u ∈ N(v). Hence fv(Av) ≥ 1dv (
∑
u∈N(v) fv(Au) + fv(R)),
i.e agent v is dominant.
The next concept is heavily used in our protocol as well as its analysis. It also provides an
alternative perspective of the concepts above, as discussed in the following paragraph.
Definition 5 (Bonus). Given an allocation {Av}v∈V , the difference fv(Av)−fv(Au) is called agent
v’s bonus over agent u; the summation
∑
u∈N(v)(fv(Av) − fv(Au)) is called agent v’s bonus over
her neighbors.
It is easy to see that agent v does not envy agent u if her bonus over agent u is nonnegative.
Agent v is proportional if her bonus over her neighbors is nonnegative. Besides, agent v is dominant
if her bonus over her neighbors is at least the value of the residue. Agent v dominates agent u if
her bonus over agent u is at least the value of the residue.
2.2 The Core Protocol
Our protocol repeatedly invokes the Core Protocol, which was proposed by Aziz and Mackenzie in
their celebrated paper [5] to deal with the canonical case where the underlying graph is a complete
graph. We denote this protocol by Core(r,N,R), where R is the residue to be allocated among
agents in N ⊆ V , and agent r ∈ N serves as a cutter, who will cut the residue R into m = |N |
equally preferable pieces at the very beginning of the protocol. The protocol returns a (possibly
partial) allocation {Xv}v∈V of R and an updated residue R′ = R\(∪v∈VXv) with the following
properties.
• Each agent v ∈ N obtains (possibly a part of) exactly one out of the m pieces cut by the
cutter r. Besides, the cutter r and one more agent u 6= r each obtains a complete piece.
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• The allocation {Xv}v∈V is globally envy-free. That is, for any v, u ∈ N , fv(Xv) ≥ fv(Xu),
despite whether or not v and u are adjacent.
It was shown in [5] that the Core Protocol is bounded by n2n+3 queries. In Subsection 3.3, we give
a tighter analysis and improve the bound to O(cn) queries for any constant c > 4. For completeness
and readability, we also present the overall description of the Core Protocol in that subsection.
Definition 6 (Snapshot). The allocation {Xv}v∈V returned by an execution of the Core Protocol
is called a snapshot.
The Core Protocol reduces to the famous Cut and Choose Protocol when |N | = 2 and therefore
will allocate the residue R completely among agents in N . When |N | ≥ 3, the updated residue
R′ is possibly non-empty. Fortunately, as described below, it is guaranteed that in a snapshot the
cutter r has a large bonus over some agent u ∈ N , which makes it possible to make the cutter r
dominant.
Definition 7 (Insignificant piece). Given a snapshot {Xv}v∈V and the updated residue R′ returned
by Core(r,N,R) with m = |N | ≥ 3, a piece Xu is called an insignificant piece if fr(Xr)− fr(Xu) ≥
fr(R
′)/(m − 2). We say the cutter r has a significant bonus over the agent who is allocated an
insignificant piece in the snapshot.
Observation 2. Given a snapshot {Xv}v∈V and the updated residue R′ returned by Core(r,N,R)
with m = |N | ≥ 3, there exists at least one insignificant piece.
Proof. By the properties of the Core Protocol, in the snapshot the cutter r and some other agent
each obtains a piece of value fr(R)/m. Hence the remaining m − 2 agents are allocated pieces of
value fr(R)− 2mfr(R)− fr(R′). By an averaging argument, there exists an agent u who obtains a
piece Xu such that
fr(Xu) ≤
fr(R)− 2mfr(R)− fr(R′)
m− 2 =
fr(R)
m
− fr(R
′)
m− 2 = fr(Xr)−
fr(R
′)
m− 2 .
Therefore, Xu is an insignificant piece.
It turns out that the cutter r can finally dominate the agent u who holds an insignificant piece
by the following procedure: starting from R′, run the Core Protocol another k ≥ m ln(m − 2)/2
times on the continually updated residue with agent r as the cutter. On the one hand, the cutter r’s
bonus over agent u in the final allocation is at least fr(R
′)/(m−2), since the snapshots generated by
the following executions of the Core Protocol is envy-free. On the other hand, since one execution
of the Core Protocol reduces the residue to at most an (m−2)/m fraction in the cutter’s valuation,
the final residue is of value at most (m−2m )
kfr(R
′), which is smaller than fr(R
′)/(m − 2). As a
result, the cutter r dominates agent u at the moment.
3 The Proportional Protocol
Our protocol runs in two stages. In the first stage, the protocol specifies an agent r that is from
the center2 of G. Then the CreateDominance Protocol in Subsection 3.1 will guarantee that agent
r is dominant. In the second stage, starting from agent r, we manage to make every other agent
dominant by invoking the DiffuseDominance Protocol designed in Subsection 3.2. The remaining
residue will also be allocated in this stage, resulting in a proportional allocation of the whole cake.
We summarize these two stages as the Main Protocol (Algorithm 1).
2The center of a graph is the set of vertices whose eccentricities equal to the radius of the graph. Recall that the
eccentricity of a vertex is the greatest distance between other vertices and it.
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Algorithm 1: Main Protocol
Input: A graph G = (V,E) with |V | = n, a cake R = [0, 1].
Output: A proportional allocation of the cake R on graph G.
1 Pick an agent r that lies in the center of G.
2 CreateDominance(G,R, r).
3 DiffuseDominance(G,R, r).
3.1 Create the First Dominant Agent
The CreateDominance Protocol (Algorithm 2) depicts how a specified agent r can be made domi-
nant. By Observation 1, it suffices for the task if we are able to find an allocation in which agent r
is envy-free and additionally she dominates one of her neighbors. To this end, we resort to the Core
Protocol and manipulate the snapshots returned by running it multiple times on the continuously
updated residue. By the definition of insignificant pieces (Definition 7), agent r will finally dominate
one of her neighbors if this neighbor is allocated an insignificant piece in some snapshot. Unfortu-
nately, however, it could be the case that the insignificant pieces are always allocated to agent r’s
non-neighbors. Consequently, the most difficult part of the task lies in how it is guaranteed that an
insignificant piece is allocated to some neighbor of agent r. We manage to overcome this difficulty
by exchanging agents’ pieces allocated in the same snapshot, in the meanwhile maintaining the
proportionality of the overall allocation. Our key observation is that a pair of adjacent agents is
able to safely exchange their pieces in one of at most 2n snapshots. Specifically, two adjacent agents
will exchange their pieces allocated in the snapshot where their bonuses over each other are both
smaller than those in the remaining snapshots. In doing so, the loss incurred by exchanging pieces
in the selected snapshot will be bounded by the bonuses reserved in the other snapshots, leading
the overall allocation to remain proportional. As an immediate application of the observation, our
protocol manages to transfer the insignificant pieces held by an agent u to some neighbor of agent
r along a shortest path from agent u to agent r. The parameter C ′ at the beginning of the protocol
denotes the number of snapshots required to ensure that some agent u holds an enough number of
insignificant pieces such that at least one of them can be successfully transferred to some neighbor
of agent r. The value of C ′ will be determined in Lemma 2.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 2 returns a (possibly partial) locally proportional allocation on graph G where
agent r is dominant.
Proof. We assume w.l.o.g. that the insignificant pieces in the C ′ snapshots are always allocated to
agent r’s non-neighbors, since otherwise by Observation 1, agent r will be dominant after step 4.
Under this assumption, some non-neighbor u of agent r is guaranteed to obtain the insignificant
pieces in at least C = C ′/(n − 1) snapshots by an averaging argument. Below we show that every
agent remains proportional in the overall allocation throughout the remaining part of the protocol.
First observe that agents not in the path P ′ = u1u2 · · · uk remain envy-free and thus proportional
throughout the protocol, since they never have their pieces exchanged, and a snapshot is globally
envy-free, implying that they always hold the best piece in a snapshot.
Next we show by induction that each agent in P ′ remains proportional after agent ui and
agent ui+1 exchanged their pieces in snapshots from Si+1, assuming that each agent is proportional
before the exchange. First observe that for any j > i+ 1, agent uj will remain envy-free and thus
proportional, since she has not yet had her pieces exchanged. Next, we consider agent ui+1 and
agent ui. Below we use bj(u, v) to denote agent u’s bonus over agent v in a given snapshot S
j before
the exchange and b′j(u, v) to denote the corresponding bonus after the exchange.
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Algorithm 2: CreateDominance
Input: A graph G = (V,E) with |V | = n, a cake R, and an agent r.
Output: A (possibly partial) proportional allocation of R and a corresponding residue,
where r is dominant.
1 for j = 1, · · · , C ′ do
2 Run Core(r, V,R) to obtain a snapshot.
3 if there is a neighbor v of agent r such that agent v obtains an insignificant piece in this
snapshot then
4 Run Core(r, V,R) n2 ln(n− 2) times to make agent r dominate agent v.
5 return the current allocation of R and an updated residue.
6 end
7 end
8 Pick an agent u who obtains insignificant pieces in at least C = C ′/(n − 1) snapshots.
Denote by S1 = {Sj : j = 1, · · · , C} the collection of these snapshots.
9 Find a shortest path P = u1u2 · · · ukr (u1 = u) from agent u to agent r (here k ≥ 2).
10 for i = 1, · · · , k − 1 do
11 Agent ui chooses a collection S ′i of dui |Si|dui+dui+1+1 snapshots from Si for which she values
her bonus over agent ui+1 the most.
12 Agent ui+1 chooses a collection S ′′i of
dui+1 |Si|
dui+dui+1+1
snapshots from Si\S ′i for which she
values her bonus over agent ui the most.
13 Let Si+1 = Si\(S ′i ∪ S ′′i ).
14 For each snapshot in Si+1, exchange pieces held by agent ui and agent ui+1.
15 end
16 Run Core(r, V,R) n2 ln(n− 2) times to make agent r dominate agent uk.
17 return a (possibly partial) allocation of R and an updated residue.
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For agent ui+1, we show that her loss incurred by exchanging pieces in snapshots from Si+1 is
covered by her bonuses over agent ui in snapshots from S ′′i , thus remaining proportional. Given a
snapshot Sj from Si+1, the bonuses bj(ui+1, v) before the exchange are non-negative, since agent
ui+1 has not had her piece exchanged. After the exchange, the updated bonuses b
′
j satisfy that
b′j(ui+1, ui) = −bj(ui+1, ui) and b′j(ui+1, v) = bj(ui+1, v) − bj(ui+1, ui) for agent v 6= ui. Conse-
quently, the loss in agent ui+1’s bonus over her neighbors incurred by exchanging pieces in S
j is
dui+1 · bj(ui+1, ui). The total loss incurred by exchanging pieces in snapshots from Si+1 is therefore
dui+1 ·
∑
Sj∈Si+1
bj(ui+1, ui). By the choice of S ′′i , however, |S ′′i | = dui+1 · |Si+1| and agent ui+1’s
bonus over agent ui in any snapshot from S ′′i is at least that in any snapshot from Si+1. Therefore,
the loss has been totally covered.
The same conclusion holds for agent ui, but it deserves to illustrate some additional details.
Note that the bonuses bj(ui, v) in a given snapshot Sj before the exchange could be negative. They
are indeed the losses incurred when agent ui−1 and agent ui exchanged their pieces and have already
been covered at that time. Hence there is no need to worry about the first part of the bonuses
b′j(ui, v) = bj(ui, v) − bj(ui, ui+1) after the exchange. The second part is bounded by the same
argument as that for agent ui+1.
For any j < i, the proportionality of agent uj follows immediately from the argument below. By
the analysis above, the reason why an agent remains proportional is that whenever she is reallocated
an inferior piece in a snapshot, the loss is covered as if she is reallocated a piece of the same value
as the best piece in this snapshot. As a result, this agent will still remain proportional as long as
she is not reallocated another inferior piece in the future.
Agent r remains envy-free throughout the protocol. Let C ′ be the value determined in Lemma
2 such that Sk is non-empty, the neighbor uk of agent r is guaranteed to obtain the insignificant
pieces in the snapshots from Sk. By Observation 1, agent r will be dominant after step 16.
Lemma 2. Algorithm 2 uses O(n · (6nk )k T (n)) queries by setting C = (6nk )k, where k is the length
of the shortest path P found by Algorithm 2 and T (n) is the number of queries used in the Core
Protocol.
Proof. We bound the complexity of the protocol by determining an appropriate value of C such
that Sk is non-empty. Since |Si| = (dui + dui+1 + 1) · |Si+1|, a lower bound of C is
C = |S1| ≥
k−1∏
i=1
(dui + dui+1 + 1).
For i = 1, 2, 3, let ki = |{uj ∈ P | j ≡ i (mod 3)}|. Thus k1 + k2 + k3 = k. Since P is a shortest
path, agent ui and agent uj have no common neighbors if |i− j| > 2. Therefore, for i = 1, 2, 3,
dui + dui+3 + · · ·+ du3(ki−1)+i + ki ≤ n.
Summing up these inequalities yields
k∑
i=1
dui + k ≤ 3n.
By the fundamental inequality,
k−1∏
i=1
(dui + dui+1 + 1) ≤
(
2
∑k
i=1 dui + k
k
)k
≤
(
6n
k
)k
.
9
Hence it suffices to set C =
(
6n
k
)k
. The lemma follows since the complexity of the Core Protocol is
dominant in Algorithm 2 and it is invoked O(nC) times.
We summarize the above results as Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 2 returns a (possibly partial) locally proportional allocation on graph G
where agent r is dominant and uses O(n · (6nk )k T (n)) queries, where k is the length of the shortest
path P found by Algorithm 2 and T (n) is the number of queries used in the Core Protocol.
3.2 Make Every Agent Dominant
In principle, each agent can be made dominant by running the CreateDominance Protocol with it
as an input. However, the DiffuseDominance Protocol (Algorithm 3) shows that it is possible to
fulfill the task by only using additional O(n2) calls of the Core Protocol once the first dominant
agent r was created. The key observation is that a dominant agent will remain proportional even if
she is excluded from the allocation of the residue. Thus by invoking the Core Protocol to allocate
the residue among the remaining agents, the neighbors of a dominant agent are able to collect
enough bonuses over her and finally dominate her.
Algorithm 3: DiffuseDominance
Input: A graph G = (V,E) with |V | = n, the residue R, a dominant agent r ∈ V .
Output: A proportional allocation of the cake R on graph G.
1 D = {r}.
2 while D 6= V do
3 Pick a neighbor v of D.
4 Run Core(v, V \D,R) Kv times, where Kv will be determined in the analysis.
5 D = D ∪ {v}.
6 end
7 return a proportional allocation of the cake R on graph G.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 3 returns a locally proportional complete allocation of the cake R on graph
G with O(n2) calls of the Core Protocol.
Proof. We first fix some notations for a particular ‘while’ loop where a neighbor v of D serves as
a cutter of the Core Protocol. Let {A0u}u∈V be the partial allocation and R0 be the residue just
before this loop. For k = 1, · · · ,Kv , let {Xku}u∈V be the snapshot and Rk = Rk−1\(∪u∈VXku) be the
updated residue returned by Core(v, V \D,Rk−1). Then AKvu = A0u ∪ (∪Kvi=1Xiu) denotes the pieces
allocated to agent u ∈ V and RKv denotes the residue when the ‘while’ loop terminates. Assume
by induction that the allocation {A0u}u∈V is locally proportional and agents in D are dominant,
we prove that a) the allocation {AKvu }u∈V is still locally proportional, and b) agent v becomes
dominant by setting an appropriate value for Kv. Note that the base case holds due to Theorem
1, by running Algorithm 2 before Algorithm 3.
During the ‘while’ loop, the residue is allocated among agents in V \D by the Core Protocol
in an envy-free manner, thus agents in V \D remain proportional. Besides, since agents in D are
already dominant, they will remain proportional despite how the residue is allocated. As a result,
the allocation {AKvu }u∈V is still locally proportional.
Let |V \D| = m. We show that agent v will be dominant by setting Kv = (m − 2) · ln 3 if
m ≥ 3 and 1 otherwise. When m = 2, the Core Protocol reduces to the famous Cut and Choose
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Protocol where the residue is allocated completely among agents in V \D. Since at this point the
whole cake has been allocated, the protocol terminates with the desired properties. When m ≥ 3,
we first claim that agent v’s bonus over her neighbors is at least
∑Kv
k=1 fv(X
k
v ). Since agent v is
a neighbor of D, there exists an agent r′ ∈ D such that they are adjacent. For each snapshot
{Xku}u∈V , the piece Xkr′ is empty since agent r′ was excluded from the allocation of Rk−1. Hence
agent v’s bonus over agent r′ in this snapshot is fv(X
k
v ). The claim follows by the assumption that
{A0u}u∈V is locally proportional. Next we show that the value
∑Kv
k=1 fv(X
k
v ) is larger than the value
fv(R
Kv), which implies that agent v is dominant. By the properties of the Core Protocol, we have
fv(X
k
v ) =
1
mfv(R
k−1) and fv(R
k) ≤ m−2m fv(Rk−1). Therefore,
Kv∑
k=1
fv(X
k
v ) =
1
m
Kv−1∑
k=0
fv(R
k)
≥ 1
m
Kv−1∑
k=0
(
m
m− 2
)Kv−k
fv(R
Kv)
=
1
2
((
m
m− 2
)Kv
− 1
)
fv(R
Kv)
≥ fv(RKv).
The last inequality holds since we choose Kv = (m− 2) · ln 3.
Finally, since there are n agents and each agent invokes the Core Protocol Kv = O(n) times,
the protocol only needs O(n2) calls of the Core Protocol.
3.3 The Complexity of Core Protocol
To further reduce the overall complexity of our protocol, we give a tighter upper bound of the Core
Protocol in this subsection. Previously, Aziz and Mackenzie [5] showed that the Core Protocol
is bounded by n2n+3 queries. They did not optimize their analysis since the main focus of their
paper is to obtain a bounded protocol. For readability of our analysis, we present the Core Protocol
(Algorithm 4) as well as the SubCore Protocol (Algorithm 5) it invokes in this subsection.
Lemma 3. The Core Protocol uses O(cn) queries for any constant c > 4.
Proof. We directly analyze the complexity of the SubCore Protocol, since the Core Protcol needs
only n−1 additional queries. Denote by T (n′′, n′) the number of queries that the SubCore Protocol
needs to allocate n′′ pieces among n′ agents (n′′ ≥ n′). The ‘for’ loop iterates for m = 1, · · · , n′. In
the m-th iteration, agent m needs n′′ evaluations in step 2. In step 5, each agent needs n′′− (m−1)
evaluations on uncontested pieces and m− 1 cuts on contested pieces. Thus this step costs at most
n′n′′ queries in total. The ‘while’ loop may iterate for |W | = 1, · · · ,m−2 in the worst case. In each
iteration, the SubCore Protocol is invoked in step 9 on the m− 1 contested pieces among agents in
W and therefore requires T (m− 1, |W |) queries. Step 11 costs |W |+ 1 evaluations. Step 13 costs
another T (m− 1,m− 1) queries. To summarize, the number of queries used in the m-th iteration
of the ‘for’ loop is at most
m−1∑
i=1
T (m− 1, i) +
m−2∑
i=1
(i+ 1) + n′′ + n′n′′.
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Therefore, T (n′′, n′) satisfies the recurrence
T (n′′, n′) ≤
n′∑
m=1
(
m−1∑
i=1
T (m− 1, i) +
(
m− 1
2
)
+ (m− 2) + n′′ + n′n′′
)
=
n′∑
i=1
n′∑
m=i+1
T (m− 1, i) +
(
n′
3
)
+
n′(n′ − 3)
2
+ n′n′′ + n′2n′′
≤
n′∑
i=1
(n′ − i)T (n′ − 1, i) +
(
n′
3
)
+
n′(n′ − 3)
2
+ n′n′′ + n′2n′′
=
n′−1∑
i=1
iT (n′ − 1, n′ − i) +
(
n′
3
)
+
n′(n′ − 3)
2
+ n′n′′ + n′2n′′.
We then prove by induction on n′+n′′ that T (n′′, n′) ≤ c˜n′+n′′ for any constant c˜ > 2 and sufficiently
large n′ + n′′ such that(
n′
3
)
+
n′(n′ − 3)
2
+ n′n′′ + n′2n′′ ≤
(
1− 1
(c˜− 1)2
)
c˜n
′+n′′ .
Under the above assumptions and the fact that n′′ ≥ n′, we have
T (n′′, n′) ≤
n′−1∑
i=1
ic˜2n
′−i−1 +
(
n′
3
)
+
n′(n′ − 3)
2
+ n′n′′ + n′2n′′
≤ c˜n′+n′′
n′−1∑
i=1
ic˜−i−1 +
(
1− 1
(c˜− 1)2
)
c˜n
′+n′′
≤ 1
(c˜− 1)2 c˜
n′+n′′ +
(
1− 1
(c˜− 1)2
)
c˜n
′+n′′
= c˜n
′+n′′ .
Therefore, the Core Protocol is bounded by n− 1 + T (n, n− 1) = O(c˜2n) queries.
Algorithm 4: Core Protocol
Input: Specified cutter (say agent i ∈ N), agent set N such that i ∈ N , and unallocated
cake R.
Output: An envy-free allocation of cake R′ ⊂ R for agents in N and updated unallocated
cake R\R′.
1 Ask agent i to cut the cake R into n equally preferred pieces.
2 Run SubCore Protocol on the n pieces with agent set N\{i} with each agent having a
benchmark value as zero. The call gives an allocation to the agents in N\{i} such that one
of the n pieces is untrimmed and unallocated.
3 Give i one of the unallocated untrimmed pieces from the previous step.
4 return envy-free partial allocation (in which each agent gets a connected piece) as well as
the unallocated cake.
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Algorithm 5: SubCore Protocol
Input: Cake cut into n′′ pieces (with n′′ ≤ n) to be allocated among agents in set
{1, · · · , n′} = N ′ ⊆ N with n′ = |N ′| and a benchmark value bj for each j ∈ N ′.
{We only call SubCore if the benchmark values are such that there exists an
envy-free allocation of agents in N ′ where each agent gets at most one of the pieces
giving him at least the specified benchmark value.}
Output: A neat envy-free partial allocation for agents in N ′ in which each agent j ∈ N ′
gets a connected piece of value at least bj .
1 for m = 1 to n′ do
2 if the piece agent m preferred at the launch of the protocol is still unallocated then
3 we tentatively give agent m that piece and go to the next iteration of the ‘for’ loop.
4 else
5 the first m agents are contesting for the same m− 1 tentatively allocated pieces. We
call them the contested pieces. For each agent j, set b′j to be the maximum of bj
and agent j’s value of the most preferred uncontested piece. Then each agent in [m]
is asked to place a trim on all contested pieces of high enough value so that the
contested piece on the right hand side of her trim is of the same value as b′j .
6 Set W to be the set of agents who trimmed most (had the rightmost trim) in some
piece.
7 while |W | < m− 1 do
8 Ignore the previous trims of agents in W from now on and forget the previous
allocation.
9 Run SubCore Protocol on the contested pieces with W as the target set of agents
(with b′j as their benchmark value input) and for each contested piece, the part
to the left side of the rightmost trim by an agent in [m]\W is ignored. {The
result of the recursive call of SubCore is an allocation that gives a (partial)
contested piece to each of the agent in W .}
10 Take any unallocated contested piece a. The current left margin (beyond which
the piece is ignored) is by agent i ∈ [m]\W .
W ←W ∪ {i}.
At this point the current allocation of agents in W is tentative and not
permanently made. {An agent from [m]\W has been added to W . For the
updated W , each agent in W gets a partial contested piece and no agent envies
an unallocated piece. Recall that for each piece, the left side of the rightmost
trim by an agent in [m]\ W is ignored.}
11 Update the value b′j of each agent j in W to equal the value of the piece that they
have been tentatively allocated.
12 end
13 Run SubCore on all agents in W and the set of contested pieces, where we ignore the
part to the left of the trim make by the agent in [m]\W . The benchmark of each
j ∈W is b′j.
14 The only agent j remaining in [m]\W is tentatively given her most preferred
uncontested piece.
15 end
16 end
17 return envy-free partial cake for agents in N ′ as well as the unallocated cake.
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3.4 Analysis of Main Protocol
Combining all the results from previous subsections, we have
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 returns a locally proportional allocation on graph G with O(14n) queries.
Proof. By Theorem 1 and 2, the allocation returned by the Main Protocol is locally proportional.
The CreateDominance Protocol is dominant in the overall complexity and uses O(n · (6nk )k T (n))
queries by Theorem 1, where k is the length of the shortest path P found in it and T (n) is the
number of queries of the Core Protocol. Since the Main Protocol selects an agent r from the center
of G, we have k ≤ n/2. By setting c = 7/√3 > 4 in Lemma 3, nT (n) = O((7/√3)n). Hence the
overall complexity of the Main Protocol is bounded by O((2
√
3)n · (7/√3)n) = O(14n).
We remark that when the underlying graph G is a path, the CreateDominance Protocol may
invoke the Core Protocol roughly n · 5n/2 times in the worst case. Thus even if the Core Protocol
used polynomial queries, Algorithm 1 is still exponential.
4 Towards Envy-freeness on Trees
This section briefly discusses locally envy-free allocations on trees. Previously, a continuous locally
envy-free protocol on trees was already known [8]. However, despite of the globally envy-free
protocol designed in [5], a simple discrete and bounded one on trees is still unknown. As we have
seen, the Core Protocol in [5] which obtains an envy-free partial allocation is the cornerstone of
several cake cutting protocols. In light of this, we present in this section a slightly weaker “Core
Protocol” (Algorithm 6) which specializes on trees, but with a significantly improved complexity
of O(n2) queries.
Algorithm 6: TreeCore
Input: A rooted tree T with root r, |T | = n, and the cake [0, 1].
Output: A locally envy-free partial allocation on T and a residue R.
1 Root r cuts the cake into n equally preferred pieces in her own measure and temporarily
takes all these n pieces.
2 Initialize the residue R = ∅.
3 for each agent v ∈ T in a BFS order do
4 Agent v have received |T (v)| pieces at the moment, where T (v) denotes the subtree
rooted at v. Among them agent v’s least favorite piece is denoted by p∗. For each piece
p she holds, agent v is asked to cut a part of it such that she thinks the remaining part
p′ and p∗ are of the same value. Piece p− p′ is added into the residue R.
5 for each immediate child u of v in an arbitrary order do
6 Agent u takes |T (u)| pieces she values the highest from the remaining pieces that
agent v holds.
7 end
8 The last piece that agent v currently holds is allocated to her.
9 end
10 return the current allocation and the residue.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 6 returns a locally envy-free partial allocation on tree T with 2n2 queries.
Indeed, an agent never envies her descendants on T . Besides, root r of T obtains 1/n of the cake.
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Proof. Step 5 to 8 are well-defined since |T (v)| = ∑u: child of v |T (u)| + 1. It follows that each
agent gets possibly a part of exactly one piece cut by root r after the protocol terminates. Then
root r obtains 1/n of the cake since she cuts the cake into n equal pieces and reserves one of them.
Next, we show that no envy happens when agent v’s children take pieces from him. For a child
u of agent v, she takes |T (u)| pieces which she values the highest from the remaining pieces that
agent v holds when it is agent u’s turn. Agent u will finally obtain a piece that is of the same value
as the least valuable one among those |T (u)| pieces. Despite that, it is still better than the piece
allocated to agent v, which guarantees agent u will not envy agent v. As for agent v, since she cuts
all |T (v)| pieces she holds into an equal value before her children take pieces from him, she will not
envy her children despite whichever piece she is finally allocated. In addition, v will not envy her
descendants since the pieces only gets smaller as the protocol proceeds.
The root needs (n − 1) cut queries to obtain n equal pieces. Each non-root agent u needs to
evaluate at most |T (v)| pieces held by her parent v and selects |T (u)| pieces from them. She will
make |T (u)| − 1 cuts on her selected pieces. As a result, each agent needs |T (v)|+ |T (u)| − 1 ≤ 2n
queries and hence the protocol is bounded by 2n2.
5 Conclusion
There remains several open problems on the cake cutting problem under social graphs. First of all,
it remains unknown whether or not a locally proportional allocation on any undirected graph can
be found using polynomial queries. Next, does there exist a simple locally proportional protocol for
any given directed graph? The DiffuseDominance Protocol still works for directed graphs. However,
the exchange operation in the CreateDominance Protocol fails, since it requires that agents who
are prepared to exchange their pieces are able to see each other. Finally, a simple and discrete
locally envy-free protocol still lacks even for special classes of graphs.
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